Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 24 | Issue 3

Article 3

2016

Mandatory Restitution for Enticing a Minor for
Sexual Purposes: Additional Punishment or
Compensation for the Victim?
Myra S. Reyes

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Remedies
Commons
Recommended Citation
Reyes, Myra S. (2016) "Mandatory Restitution for Enticing a Minor for Sexual Purposes: Additional Punishment or Compensation
for the Victim?," Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law: Vol. 24: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Reyes: Mandatory Restitution for Enticing a Minor for Sexual Purposes: Additional Punishment or Compensation for the Victim?

MANDATORY RESTITUTION FOR
ENTICING A MINOR FOR SEXUAL
PURPOSES: ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT
OR COMPENSATION FOR THE VICTIM?
MYRA S. REYES*
I.	
  	
  Introduction ........................................................................................... 402	
  
II.	
  	
  Background .......................................................................................... 404	
  
A.	
   Mandatory Victims Restitution Act......................................... 404	
  
1.	
   Discrepancies between 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and U.S.S.G.
§4B1.2(a)(2)....................................................................... 406	
  
2.	
   Determining the Crime of Violence Standard ................... 408	
  
3.	
   Ordinary Case and Categorical Approaches ...................... 410	
  
III. Analysis .............................................................................................. 411	
  
A.	
   Distinctions Between “Crime of Violence” Definitions
Allow a Defendant to Escape Paying Restitution to His or
Her Victim. .............................................................................. 411	
  
B.	
   Forcing Victim’s to Prove They Suffered a “Crime of
Violence” Makes Receiving Restitution More Difficult and
Contradicts the Purpose the Legislation. ................................. 422	
  
C.	
   Restitution and Sentencing Increases Serve Different
Purposes and Should be Held to Different Standards. ............ 426	
  
IV.	
  	
  Policy Recommendations ................................................................... 429	
  
V.	
  	
  Conclusion ........................................................................................... 430	
  

* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2017, American University Washington College of
Law; B.A. Philosophy, 2014, Seton Hall University. I would like to thank my parents,
Exequiel Sedigo Reyes and Maria Fe Sambayan Reyes, for their endless love and
support throughout my pursuit of a legal education. I also want to thank Professor
Stephen Wermeil, Lindell Arino, and my other family and friends who have supported
me throughout this process as well as the hard work and dedication of the Journal of
Gender, Social Policy, and the Law Publications Team.

401

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

1

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3

402

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW
I.

[Vol. 24:3

INTRODUCTION

The federal government charged and convicted Thomas Patrick Keelan
(hereinafter “Keelan”) under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for coercing and enticing
J.S., a fifteen-year-old boy, for prostitution or sexual activity by means of
interstate commerce, and for an attempt at coercing and enticing J.S for
prostitution or any sexual activity by means of interstate commerce.1 On
May 13, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s order for Keelan to pay mental health expenses
to J.S.’s parents as restitution.2 On January 11, 2016, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari to this case.3 Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (“MVRA”), Keelan was required to pay restitution for two
counts of coercing and enticing a minor for prostitution.4 The MVRA
provides, inter alia, that a district court must order a defendant to pay
restitution to the “victim” of a “crime of violence.”5
Keelan’s charges arose from his improper one-year sexual relationship
with fifteen-year-old high school student, J.S.6 Keelan was fifty-one years
old and taught at J.S.’s Jewish high school.7 J.S. suffered from racial,
religious, and sexual identity discrimination, and after confiding in Keelan,
their relationship gradually became sexual in nature.8 At trial, the
government offered expert testimony showing that Keelan’s interactions
with J.S. were part of a common technique that child predators used to
manipulate their victims called the “grooming process.”9 The grooming
1. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 866 (11th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) will be referred to as the crime of enticement and coercion of a
minor] (explaining that Keelan maintained a sexual relationship with a high school
student, J.S., for over a year and often traveled across state lines to continue the
relationship until apprehended by an FBI agent).
2. Id. (showing the district court gave a restitution order of $104,886.05 for J.S.’s
mental health expenses under the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act).
3. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S.Ct. 857 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2016) (No. 15-7100) (showing that the petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was denied).
4. See id. at 866. (charging Keelan under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2015)).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A) (2015) (allowing courts to order defendants to
pay mandatory restitution for any harm caused if the offense is a crime of violence).
6. Keelan, 786 F.3d at 865 (declaring as a case of first impression that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b) is a crime of violence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) and the MVRA).
7. See id.
8. See id. at 870 (showing J.S. confessing he was homosexual and being
persuaded to explore sexual activity by Keelan).
9. See id.; see generally Thomas D. Lyon, Children’s Memory for Conversations
about Sexual Abuse: Legal and Psychological Implications, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L.
REV. 411, 423-24 (2014) (defining “child grooming” as the relationship between a
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process refers to the relationship between a child and a child predator
where the predator capitalizes on the child’s trust, compliance, and silence
to make the child comfortable with the prospect of having sex.10 At
Keelan’s suggestion, they incorporated sex toys, bondage, pornography,
and sadomasochism into their relationship.11 Keelan relocated to Virginia
for another teaching job but he would regularly drive back to Florida where
he would select, reserve, and pay for a room to have sex with J.S.12 J.S.
cooperated with law enforcement officials who arrested Keelan during a
sting operation at the Florida hotel.13 On his way down to the hotel on an
interstate highway, Keelan also bought various sex toys to use on J.S.14
When FBI agents searched Keelan’s car, they found a wide array of sex
toys, bondage devices, lubricant, and pornographic DVDs featuring young
adult males that Keelan purchased to use on J.S.15
Keelan argued against the propriety of the restitution order because J.S.
did not suffer a bodily injury and J.S. cannot recover mental health
expenses.16 He also argued that his offense did not cause the medical
treatment expenses.17 Although he did admit that his offense was a crime
of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) §
4B1.2(a)(2), Keelan argued that coercion and enticement of a minor was
not a crime of violence under the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).18
This Comment argues that coercion and enticement of a minor is a crime
of violence under both 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2);
therefore, a victim of that type of crime should be paid restitution under the
child and a perpetrator where the perpetrator uses a specific method to capitalize on the
child’s trust to sexually exploit the child).
10. C.f. Lyon, supra note 9.
11. See Keelan, 786 F.3d at 868 (showing Keelan blindfolded, tied, spanked, and
whipped J.S during their sexual encounters).
12. See id.
13. See id. at 865.
14. See Brief for Government at 11, United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865 (2015)
(No. 12-20496) (showing that Keelan incorporated sex toys such as cock rings, various
bondage and restraint devices, nipple clamps, condoms, old ties, rope, a whip, a feather
duster, six bottles of lubricant, dildos, two dozen latex gloves, a dual butt plug, and a
muscle relaxant)
15. See Keelan, 786 F. 3d at 865 (finding the pornographic DVDs featured young
males with sexually explicit titles and contents).
16. See id. at 872.
17. See id. (explaining defense counsel’s argument there was no nexus between
the enticement crime and psychological damage therefore Keelan should not be forced
to pay mandatory restitution to J.S.’s parents).
18. See id. at 868. (showing that Keelan admitted to his crime under 18 U.S.C. §
2422(b) but that the crime was not included in the MVRA).
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MVRA.19 Part II of this Comment examines the type of victim the MVRA
intended to protect, discrepancies in the definition of a crime of violence,
and the crime of violence standard using the categorical and ordinary case
approaches.20 Part III argues that multiple definitions create restitution
difficulties for the courts, victims, and the defendant; namely, if the
defendant is considered a repeat offender.21 Part IV recommends that there
should be stricter elements to determine a crime of violence.22 Finally, Part
V concludes that the coercion and enticement of a minor should be
considered a crime of violence because sexually exploited children are
always at risk of danger.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
Federal courts typically lack jurisdiction to order any type of restitution;
however, Congress enacted a statute to permit federal court-ordered
restitution for special circumstances.24 On April 24, 1996, Congress
codified the MVRA as a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act.25 This distinguishes itself by not only providing a
means for punishment or rehabilitation, but also attempting to provide
victims with a way to recover their personal and financial losses to create a
more victim-focused criminal justice system.26 Specifically, the MVRA
requires that a defendant pay a victim court-ordered mandatory restitution
for their crime.27 The MVRA’s restitution requirements are distinguished
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A) (2015) (explaining that victims of a crime of
violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) are entitled to restitution under the MVRA
if the committed crime had a potential risk of physical harm).
20. See infra Part II (explaining the persons entitled to mandatory restitution under
the MVRA).
21. See infra Part III (arguing that the different distinctions in crime of violence
definitions allow defendants the opportunity to avoid paying restitution to victims).
22. See infra Part IV (recommending a creation of explicit elements for a crime of
violence).
23. See infra Part V (concluding that the categorical approach to interpreting the
MVRA should apply to § 2422(b)).
24. See Beth Bates Holliday, Annotation, Who is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution
Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A), 26
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 283 (2008).
25. See 141 Cong. Rec. H1302-03 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Price).
26. See id.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2015) (stating that notwithstanding any other
provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense of a crime of
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from restitution orders governed by the Victim and Witness Protection Act
in 18 U.S.C. § 3663 because judges can order the restitution.28 The statute
defines a victim as a person directly and proximately harmed by a crime of
violence resulting from the defendant’s criminal conduct.29 Additionally,
when a victim is a minor, the legal guardian of the victim may assert the
victim’s rights.30
To understand the application of the MVRA, it is necessary to
understand several different provisions of federal law.31 The MVRA only
applies to crimes of violence under the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 16 and
cannot be used otherwise.32 The act was broadly created to reform the
federal criminal code in areas such as sentencing, bail, and drug
enforcement and the statute’s definitions also include a distinction between
violent and non-violent offenses.33 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) defines a “crime of
violence” as an offense involving an element of physical force while the
definition of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) defines a “crime of violence” as an offense
involving a substantial risk of physical force against another person or
property during the execution of the offense.34 The MVRA also requires
that a known victim suffer physical injury or calculable monetary loss.35
The MVRA requires four criteria to be met: (1) a crime of violence must
have occurred; (2) the victim suffered bodily injury; (3) there is a
violence, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the
offense).
28. See id. (allowing district courts to order restitution for victims of violent
crimes).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (defining “victim” under the MVRA).
30. See id. (allowing the legal guardian of the victim, a representative of the
deceased’s estate, or legally appointed individual to assert the victim’s rights, but the
defendant cannot be named as such representative or guardian).
31. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2015) (defining a crime of violence for
sentencing purposes); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015) (defining a crime of violence
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i)(explaining that only defendants who
commit a crime under the specific definition defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2015) can
receive mandatory restitution).
33. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 377, 381 (2004) (citing § 1001(a), 98 Stat.
2136) (showing the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 16).
34. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2015) (explaining a crime of violence needs an
element of physical force during the commission of the crime); with 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
(2015) (explaining the requirements for a crime of violence that is not an enumerated
felony or has an element of actual physical force).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B) (explaining that the monetary damages
awarded under the MVRA may be applied as mental health damages associated to a
victim if there is a proven nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s
mental health issues).
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calculable amount of costs; and (4) there is proximate cause between the
injury and the restitution.36 When a crime is considered a crime of violence
under the MVRA, the convicted defendant may become a classified career
criminal for sentencing purposes.37
Keelan was convicted of one count of coercion and enticement of a
minor and one count of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor.38
The statute he was convicted under assigns criminal culpability to an
individual who uses interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce,
entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prostitution or sexual activity.39
Keelan’s case is a matter of first impression because coercion and
enticement of a minor was never categorized as a crime of violence under
the definition of § 16(b).40 The Eleventh Circuit used the sentencing
guidelines definition of a “crime of violence” as a comparison to 18 U.S.C.
§ 16’s definition.41
1.

Discrepancies between 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2)

As emphasized by United States v. Schmidt, the MVRA has two factors
to consider when determining whether restitution is allowed.42 The first
factor in determining restitution is whether the victim is the type of victim
covered by restitution in the act.43 The second factor is whether the victim
suffered a harm that can be calculated.44
Case law creates a distinction in interpreting the construction of § 16(b)
and § 4B1.2 for three main reasons.45 First, the case United States v.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (explaining the four elements required by statute
necessary to receive restitution).
37. See id. (demonstrating that under the MVRA a defendant may also be
considered a career criminal).
38. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 865 (11th Cir. 2015).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2015) (explaining the elements for the federal crime
of coercion and enticement of a minor).
40. See Keelan, 786 F.3d at 868 (explaining that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)
had not previously been considered a crime of violence, but Keelan conceded his crime
was violent under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.).
41. See id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015) (defining a crime of violence as
involving conduct with a serious potential risk of physical injury to another).
42. See United States v. Schmidt, 675 F.3d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 2012)
(determining that government employees can be considered victims under the MVRA).
43. See id. at 1167-68.
44. See id. at 1169 (showing that calculated harm is any harm that can be
converted into a monetary value).
45. See generally United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 2001)
(illustrating distinctions in definitions between 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2).
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Chapa-Garza holds that § 16(b) has narrower language than §
4B1.2(a)(2).46 Second, that the “substantial risk that physical force . . . may
be used” from § 16(b) implies only reckless disregard for the probability
that intentional force may be used.47 Third, the physical force in § 16(b) is
force that is used during the committing of the crime and not force that
resulted from the offense.48 The Fifth Circuit reinforced this notion in
United States v. Charles, where the court concluded that there were many
definitions of a crime of violence and that each definition may have a
different application.49
A distinction between violent and non-violent crimes creates a way to
decide sentencing penalties.50 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924, a crime of violence
has a substantially similar definition to the definition used in § 16(b).51 A
crime defined as a crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) will be subject to
the sentencing increases as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.52 When
classifying a crime, the statute uses the terms “crime of violence” and
“violent felony” interchangeably.53
The issue of whether coercion and enticement of a minor is considered a
crime of violence had not been directly addressed by the Eleventh Circuit
prior to Keelan.54 However, the Tenth Circuit considered this issue in
United States v. Johnson where the defendant challenged an MVRA
restitution order for one count of coercion and enticement of a minor in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and one count of interstate travel for the
46. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 924 (holding driving while intoxicated is not a
violent felony under the Sentencing Guidelines because §16(b) is narrower than
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.).
47. See id. (explaining that the language of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015) is broader
than the language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2015)).
48. See id.
49. See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 309 (5th Cir. 2002)
(acknowledging that while the definitions for a crime of violence under § 16(a) and §
4B1.2(a)(1) are identical, they are interpreted differently).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2015).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2015) (defining a crime of violence as
involving a substantial risk that physical force).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2015) (stating a felon with three previous
convictions for other violent felonies shall be fine and imprisoned not less than fifteen
years without sentence suspension or probation).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (stating a violent felony is any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that “otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).
54. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 865 (11th Cir. 2015) (analyzing
whether 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2015), is considered a crime of violence under the
MVRA).
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purpose of engaging in sexual acts with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2423(b).55 The defendant argued that the restitution was unlawful because
the court did not consider his ability to pay.56 The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court without actually addressing whether the
charges were crimes of violence.57 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
responded by citing that the Ninth Circuit did address transportation of a
minor as a crime of violence for restitution purposes.58
2.

Determining the Crime of Violence Standard

While Keelan’s scenario is a case of first impression, precedent exists for
classifying the charge as a crime of violence according to U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(a)(2) on the basis that the crime itself involves conduct that, by its
nature, poses a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.59 For
example, in United States v. Searcy, the Eleventh Circuit broadly ruled that
any felony involving the sexual exploitation of a minor inherently retains a
serious potential risk of physical injury to the victim and is a “crime of
violence” using the categorical approach.60
In United States
v. Rutherford, the same court found that a court should only look to the
elements of the convicted offense and not the underlying conduct of the
conviction for determining violent felonies.61
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Munro held that
crimes involving child exploitation will always have a substantial risk that
physical force will be used to ensure a child’s submission to the predator’s
sexual demands.62 Furthermore, in United States v. Johnson, the Tenth
55. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2015) will be referred to as ‘transportation of
minors’].
56. See id. (arguing that the court should consider the defendant’s unemployed
status and inability to pay restitution).
57. See id. at 1178. (showing that the defendant failed to prove standing in his
appeal, thus the MVRA crime of violence analysis was unnecessary because the order
was valid).
58. See id. at 1179; see also United States v. Butler, 92 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.
1996) (deciding that § 2423(b) is a crime of violence by its nature).
59. Compare United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005) (using
the categorical approach to determine crimes of violence); with United States v.
Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 1999) (using the ordinary case approach to
determine crimes of violence).
60. Searcy, 418 F.3d at 1196.
61. See Rutherford, 175 F.3d at 905 (citing United States v. Lipsey, 40 F.3d 1200,
1201 (11th Cir. 1994)) (using the ordinary case approach to determine that lewd assault
was a violent felony on the basis of the underlying elements).
62. See United States v. Munro. 394 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir. 2005) (showing that
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Circuit also acknowledged that other similar child exploitation crimes
require restitution under the MVRA.63
The Fifth Circuit in Charles also acknowledged that the definitions for a
crime of violence under § 16(a) and § 4B1.2(a)(1) are identical but § 16(b)
and § 4B1.2(a)(2) are different.64 The court affirmed the decision in
Chapa-Garza that § 16(b) applied to the force used against a person or
property, while § 4B1.2 only applies to conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another person.65
A recent case may have overturned this analysis. In Johnson v. United
States, the defendant pled guilty to a felon in possession of a firearm under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and was found to not have committed a crime of
violence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.66
The government requested an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career
Criminal Act because the defendant had a long criminal history such as the
unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun and that his possession of a
gun was a crime of violence.67 The Supreme Court concluded that 18
U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(2) is unconstitutionally vague and thus violates an
individual’s due process rights.68 The government takes away this liberty if
a law is so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the
conduct it punishes, or so lacking in enforceable standards that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.69 The defendant appealed and the Supreme Court
the attempted sexual abuse of a minor is a crime of violence even without a physical
injury because crimes against minors will always have a potential for risk of harm).
63. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1178 (1999) (stating that 18
U.S.C § 2423(b) is a crime of violence).
64. See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 311-12 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that that there are differences between the crime of violence definition in § 16(b) and §
4B1.2(a)(2) and that the definition in § 16(b) is narrower than the definition in §
4B1.2(a)(2)).
65. See id. at 312; see generally United States v. Jackson, 220 F.3d 635, 637 (5th
Cir. 2000) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s definition of a crime of violence is different
from U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s definition of a crime of violence).
66. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2553 (2015); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who is a fugitive from justice . . . to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.”).
67. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2015) (criminalizing previous offenders for
possession of a gun who also have more than three violent felonies).
68. See id. at 2554 (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926); United States v. Batchedlder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979))(explaining that the
vagueness within criminal statutes violate due process and that the standard also applies
to statutes dealing with sentencing).
69. See id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)).
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ruled that the possession of the short barreled shotgun was not a violent
felony due to the vagueness of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).70
3.

Ordinary Case and Categorical Approaches

The Eleventh Circuit is unique because it uses both the categorical
approach and the ordinary case method to determine a crime of violence.71
However, recently the “ordinary case” method was overturned by the
Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States.72 The “ordinary case” method
is one way to determine a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)
and the process was explained by Justice Alito in the majority opinion
of James v. United States.73 Previously in James, the Supreme Court held
that a crime of violence is violent not because of the actual physical harm
suffered, but because there is a possibility that an innocent person may be
harmed during the crime.74 The attempt of a crime of violence poses the
same risk that completion of a crime would hold.75
The “ordinary case” method focuses on the plain language of the statute
by using the ordinary meaning of the elements and determining if the
elements of the crime are violent.76 Using the residual clause of §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii), Justice Alito measured the risk associated with the
offense.77 His analysis began with comparing the attempted burglary to the
complete burglary, which is an enumerated offense.78 An attempt of a
crime does not require completion of all of the elements of the crime, but
rather, only a substantial step.79 To qualify as a crime of violence, Justice
70. See id. at 2551.
71. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 870-71 (11th Cir. 2015).
72. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557-58 (2015) (determining

that the definition of a crime of violence under the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924
(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague).
73. See James, 550 U.S. at 203; see also United States v. Avila, 770 F.3d 1100,
1107 (4th Cir. 2014); Rodriguez–Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 853–55 (9th Cir.
2013); United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971, 977 (11th Cir. 2012).
74. See James, 550 U.S. at 194 (holding that a crime of violence arises from the
possibility that an innocent person may confront the burglar and be injured).
75. See id. at 203-04. (showing that an attempted burglary has the same level of
danger as the danger involved in an actual burglary).
76. Id. at 192.
77. See id. (using a two-step analysis to determine a crime of violence: 1) the
offense presents a serious potential risk of physical injury and 2) similarity to another
enumerated crime).
78. See id. at 204-10 (using the residual clause from § 941(e)(2)(B)(ii) to expand
the definition of a violent felony to include attempt crimes and a potential risk of
harm).
79. See id. at 197 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990))
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Alito concluded that a court must determine if the crime’s elements
inherently pose a serious potential risk of injury to another.80
The “categorical approach” is an analysis method used to determine
whether the elements of the statute are congruent with the elements of the
crime by using the plain text of a statute to separate the elements of the
crime from the facts of the case.81 The Supreme Court found that § 16(b)
categorizes a broader range of offenses than 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) as crimes of
violence.82 However, the Court found that § 16(b) does not include all
negligent misconduct because the reckless disregard relates to the potential
risk of physical force used against another when committing a crime.83
III. ANALYSIS
A. Distinctions Between “Crime of Violence” Definitions Allow a
Defendant to Escape Paying Restitution to His or Her Victim.
The multiple definitions for “crime of violence” felonies for restitution
and sentencing purposes create confusion when determining whether a
felony is an aggravated felony.84 The committed felony must be a “crime
of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) to receive restitution under the
MVRA.85 Thus, at a sentencing hearing many prosecutors try to compare
the definitions from other sources to get an increase for the defendant’s
prison sentence.86 The three definitions for a crime of violence are used
interchangeably for both sentencing and restitution purposes.87 The
(claiming successful entry into a building is not required in an attempted burglary).
80. See id. at 208 (finding attempted burglary is an interrupted burglary which has
the potential of risk or more risk than a completed burglary; therefore by the nature of
the offense, an attempted burglary is a crime of violence).
81. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (using the categorical approach
to prove that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) has a broader definition of a crime of violence but
requires intent).
82. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2015).
83. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10.
84. See 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (2015); see also U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) (U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n 2010); accord 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3), (e)(2)(B) (2015) (defining “crime of
violence” and “violent felony”).
85. See 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i) (2015).
86. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2015) (allowing prosecutors to increase
prison sentences to defendants who have committed more than three crimes of violence
under the definition provided in the Armed Career Criminal Act).
87. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2015) (defining crimes of violence used for
determining restitution under the MVRA); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2015) (stating
the crime of violence definition used for determining sentencing outside of enumerated
felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
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definition necessary to gain restitution under the MVRA is 18 U.S.C. §
16(b) and it has been compared to § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and the U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2 to enforce its validity.
As demonstrated in Chapa-Gazra and Charles, the Fifth Circuit holds a
narrow interpretation of the definition in §16(b) compared to the
requirements needed by §4B1.2.88 In Chapa-Garza, the Texas felony of
driving while intoxicated was the disputed offense.89 For sentencing
purposes, the Fifth Circuit applied the categorical approach to determine
the crime’s status as an aggravated felony.90 Looking at the sentencing
guideline in §4B1.2, any offense that contains pure recklessness or a
conscious disregard of a substantial risk of injury to others is a crime of
violence.91 However, the reading of § 16(b) applies only when the nature
of the offense leads to a substantial likelihood that the suspect intentionally
employs physical force against another person or property during the
commission of the crime.92 Additionally, §16(b) requires the “recklessness
as regards a substantial risk that intentional force will be utilized by the
defendant to effectuate commission of the offense”.93 The physical force or
risk of harm from the physical force must be directly linked to the specific
crime and the commission of that crime.94 The definition of a “crime of
violence” for sentencing career offender purposes differs somewhat from
that in 18 U.S.C. § 16. The touchstone of ‘violence’ in the career offender
provisions is the risk that physical injury will result, rather than the risk that
physical force may be used to carry out the offense.”95

88. See United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 2001); accord
United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 412 (5th Cir. 2002) (adopting a narrower
interpretation).
89. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923.
90. See id. at 924 (disputing whether a Texas state felony of driving while
intoxicated was a crime of violence when the statute did not have an element of force).
91. See id. at 925 (discussing the Rutherford case, which found that the defendant
was intentionally negligent when deciding to drive while intoxicated, thereby creating a
potential risk of physical harm to another).
92. See id.; compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2015) (stating the residual
clause), with 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (2015) (defining a crime of violence under the MVRA for
restitution purposes). But see Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557-60
(2015) (finding that the residual clause under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
unconstitutionally vague).
93. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 925.
94. See id. at 927.
95. See id. (discussing United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418, 422 (5th
Cir. 1996), which held that the crime of indecency with a minor involving sexual
conduct was violent under §16(b) because a perpetrator would find it necessary to use
physical force to “ensure the child’s compliance” and “perpetrate the crime”).
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The Fifth Circuit in Charles discussed that the definitions for a crime of
violence under § 16(a) and § 4B1.2(a)(1) are identical but § 16(b) and §
4B1.2(a)(2) are different.96 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision in
Chapa-Garza that § 16(b) applied to the force used against a person or
property, while § 4B1.2 only applies to conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another person.97 Furthermore, the court
ruled that § 16(b) focuses on a risk of physical force and § 4B1.2(a)(2)
focuses on a risk of physical injury.98 By following this logic, only victims
that have suffered an actual physical harm can receive restitution under the
MVRA and not victims who have only had the potential risk of harm.99
Additionally, § 16(b) emphasizes a “substantial risk” and § 4B1.2(a)
requires a “serious potential risk” which is a higher level of risk than §
16(b) and includes potential risk where § 16(b) only covers actual risk.100
Section 16(b) focuses on the “nature of the felony” which is the statute
itself and not the actual facts of case, but § 4B1.2(a)(2) focuses on the
“conduct” of the crime which may take the facts of the case into
consideration.101
According to the analysis of Chapa-Garza and Charles, some victims
would be excluded from receiving restitution under the MVRA even if the
defendant committed a crime of violence for sentencing purposes.102 The
victim in Chapa-Garza would not be able to receive restitution.103 While
the defendant’s crime has a level of risk, the crime of driving under
intoxication does not involve an intentional harm that necessarily always
96. See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 311-12 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a
felon in possession of a firearm as a violent felony pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines in §4B1.2).
97. See id. at 312; see generally United States v. Jackson, 220 F.3d 635, 637 (5th
Cir. 2000) (explaining § 16(b)’s definition includes force against property, risk of
physical force, a substantial risk, and the phrase “by its nature” unlike §4B1.2).
98. See Charles, 301 F.3d at 312.
99. See id. (allowing crimes that are broader than the definition described in §
16(b) to not be considered a crime of violence even though the crime is a crime of
violence according to § 4B1.2(a)(2)).
100. See id. (drawing a distinction between a potential risk of harm versus an actual
risk of harm based on the language covered in each crime of violence definition).
101. See id.
102. See United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924-26 (5th Cir. 2001); see
also id. at 311-12 (showing that a distinction between a crime of violence under the
sentencing guidelines and the definition for restitution purposes are similar but not
equal in application).
103. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 927 (stating that although the victim suffered
harm because the defendant was driving under the influence, this offense was not a
crime of violence under § 16(b)).
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occurs during the commission of this type of crime.104 There is always a
potential of harm when driving under intoxication, but the act of the crime
itself does not cause harm, and therefore, is not a crime of violence for
restitution purposes.105 Similarly, the victim in Charles would also be
unable to receive restitution.106 This type of defendant would have the
potential to harm others but the crime itself does not on its face require the
defendant to harm others.107 In these situations, if those victims wanted to
receive restitution they would have to rely on a different charge that has a
more direct relation to physical harm.108
Chapa-Gazra’s narrow interpretation of a crime of violence between 18
U.S.C. §16(b) and U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2) created a loophole that allows
defendants to escape restitution because the defendant did not intend to
harm someone with the use of bodily force.109 Keelan argued that J.S. did
not suffer a “bodily injury” under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(2) and therefore
J.S.’s parents cannot claim restitution for a harm that did not occur.110
Keelan attempted to use this argument in order to avoid paying restitution
for J.S.’s mental health expenses.111 Keelan also tried to avoid the
restitution order by arguing that J.S. suffered from severe psychological
problems before Keelan’s sexual abuse.112 Therefore, while a crime may
be considered a crime of violence for sentencing purposes, the same crime
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Charles, 301 F.3d at 311-12 (stating the crime of possession of a gun was

not a crime of violence under § 16(b) for restitution and that sentences for felons in
possession of a firearm should only be analyzed under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4B1.2(a) definition of crime of violence).
107. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203-04 (2007) (finding that a crime
of violence may be extended to attempt crimes of violence as long as there is a
potential risk of harm). But see Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557, 2563
(2015) (overruling James by ruling that a potential risk of harm is a vague standard for
a crime of violence for sentencing purposes and violates a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights).
108. See James, 550 U.S. at 197.
109. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 927.
110. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2015) (determining
that Keelan forfeited his right to seek review on J.S.’s bodily injury under MVRA
because Keelan failed to raise a specific objection to the factual finding in the Report
and Recommendation).
111. See id. at 872 (discussing Keelan’s argument that the MVRA limits restitution
to medical services that treat only bodily injury itself not psychological consequences
following from that injury).
112. See id. at 872-73 (examining Keelan’s contention that the evidence of J.S.
cutting himself before the sexual relationship demonstrates the absence of proximate
cause of the psychological damages).
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should not be considered a crime of violence for restitution standards.
Applying this analysis to Keelan’s one count of coercion and enticement of
a minor and one count of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor,
the Eleventh Circuit had the option to consider the definition of 18 U.S.C.
§2422(b) as narrow, thereby barring J.S.’s parents from restitution, but
ultimately rejected that methodology.113
Another crime of violence definition discrepancy is the meaning of the
statutes themselves and the scope of the risk or potential risk of harm
involved in these types of crimes. The issue of a crime’s potential risk of
harm in relationship to a crime of violence can be best explained through
the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, which
overturned James v. United States.114 The ruling in James v. United States
determined that an attempted burglary would have the same potential risk
of harm as committing the actual act of burglary under the definition from
the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).115 A felony under both
18 U.S.C. 16(a) and 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1) requires use of physical force or
commission of an enumerated felony to be considered a crime of violence
for either restitution or sentencing purposes.116 Prosecutors have used the
residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to expand the definition of violent
felonies to include crimes that do not require physical force for the purpose
of increasing prison sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act.117
The application of the residual clause is controversial because it may be
seen as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion and potentially imposing an
113. See id. at 870 (finding that the definition of a crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. §
16(b) (2015) is more narrow than the definition is U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015)); see also
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 925.
114. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557, 2561 (2015) (arguing that
the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
(2015), is unconstitutionally vague about the standards of risk when determining a
crime of violence). But cf. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203-04 (2007)
(holding that a crime of violence may be extended to attempt crimes of violence as long
as there is a potential risk of harm).
115. See James, 550 U.S. at 207-08 (allowing crimes with the potential of violence
to be considered violent for sentencing).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (defining a crime of violence as an offense that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another); accord 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (2)(B) (defining a violent felony
for armed career criminals as a felon in possession of a gun that has committed three
previous convictions including serious drug offenses or crimes of violence).
117. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (stating that
Armed Criminal Career Act punishes felons for shipping, possessing, and receiving
firearm and, if the violator has three or more earlier convictions for a “serious drug
offense” or a “violent felony,” the prison term is increased to a minimum of fifteen
years and a maximum of life).
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unfair or unjust prison sentence.
The analysis in Johnson v. United States threatens the constitutionality of
the definitions of a crime of violence explained in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and
U.S.S.G. §4B1.2.118 The definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
924(e)(2)(B)(2) is unconstitutionally vague because the potential risk of
harm cannot be measured in easily understandable terms.119 The definition
failed to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes as well
inviting arbitrary enforcement based on the government’s wishes.120
Furthermore, the vague language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is similar
to language used in the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).121 The ruling of
this recent case potentially could have altered the analysis of how Keelan’s
case was decided for restitution based on congressional intent. The crime
of violence definition provided by 18 U.S.C. §16(b) for restitution purposes
has a similar definition to the definition under 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii).122 The District Court originally ordered Keelan to pay
restitution for two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b): one count of
enticement and coercion of a minor for the purposes of prostitution or
sexual activity, and one count of attempt enticement and coercion of a
minor for the purposes of prostitution or sexual activity.123
Previously, United States v. James allowed the scope of a violent felony
to expand beyond the enumerated felonies for sentencing purposes.124
118. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (“It shall be
unlawful for any person . . . who is a fugitive from justice . . . to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.”).
119. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926) and United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) to
explain that the vagueness within criminal statutes violates due process and that the
standard also applies to statutes dealing with sentencing).
120. See id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)).
121. See id. at *1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
122. Compare 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (defining a violent felony under the MVRA as an
offense involving a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense); with 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining a violent felony under the ACCA as an enumerated felony
such as burglary, arson, or extortion, involving the use of explosives, or conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another).
123. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 872-73 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing that
the district ordered Keelan to pay $10,886.05 in mental health expenses to J.S.’s
parents due to the severe psychological problems).
124. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203-04 (2007) (allowing the residual
to extend to any felony that includes the potential risk of physical harm and attempts of
crimes of violence which have the potential risk of harm). But see Johnson, 135 S. Ct.
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Currently, § 16(b) is still considered good law and the standard for
restitution.125 Although the restitution standard is similar to sentencing, it
should be considered as a separate determination. However, § 16(b) can no
longer be compared to § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to gain restitution under the
MVRA.126 If the law changes and § 16(b) is interpreted as substantially
similar to § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), then violent felonies will be limited only to
enumerated felonies or felonies which require proof of physical force or
physical injury.127 Based on that comparison, attempts of violent felonies
or crimes that are not on their face physically harmful to the victim would
bar a victim from receiving restitution for those crimes.128 By this logic if
Keelan’s case was tried after the Johnson v. United States decision, Keelan
could have had the potential to escape paying his restitution.
Keelan’s case is a case of first impression; essentially, whether the
coercion and enticement of minor for sexual purposes of prostitution
should be considered a crime of violence has never been analyzed or
discussed.129 However, there is similar case law regarding a similar statute
being classified as a crime of violence, not only for sentencing purposes but
also for restitution purposes.130 One case factually similar to Keelan’s case
that involves an analysis for restitution is the Tenth Circuit decision United
Stated v. Johnson.131
In United States v. Johnson, the defendant pled guilty for a total of four
counts including the coercion and enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. §

at 2563 (overruling United States v. James).
125. See 18 U.S.C. 16(b).
126. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (ruling the language of the residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague because there is no way to adequately measure the potential
risk of harm).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (stating a crime of violence is any violent felony
which includes enumerated felony or has an element of use, attempted use of physical
harm against another).
128. See generally Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (holding that cases that only have a
potential for harm are not crimes of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
129. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that
Keelan’s case is a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit about whether the
coercion and enticement of a minor should be a violent felony).
130. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
United States v. Butler, 92 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining if the coercion of
an enticement of a minor for prostitution, traveling in interstate commerce for sex with
a minor, and possession of child pornography is considered a crime of violence under
the MVRA).
131. See id. at 1179 (declining to overturn the district court’s determination that §
2423(b), interstate travel for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts with a minor, as a
crime of violence).
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2422(b), and the transportation of minors, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and the
first count he is charged with is the same count which is under dispute in
Keelan.132 Furthermore, in United States v. Johnson, the defendant
appealed to contest the increase in his sentencing offense level, the
restitution order without considering his ability to pay, and the restitution
order for the victim’s mental health treatment where the victim suffered no
bodily injury.133 This line of reasoning mirrors Keelan’s argument that a
victim who did not suffer bodily injury should not be able to recover
restitution under the MVRA.134
The defendant met his victim, a minor, in an internet chat room where
they corresponded for several months.135 Similarly, the evidence presented
in trial showed that Keelan corresponded by talking and texting every day
for several hours over the course of five months.136 In United States v.
Johnson, the defendant traveled through interstate commerce to meet with
his victim for sex.137 Similarly, Keelan also traveled fourteen hours from
Roanoke, Virginia to Hollywood, Florida to have sex with J.S. in a
motel.138 For a week, the defendant in United States v. Johnson and the
minor engaged in numerous sexual acts and the two continued
correspondence through the Internet and telephone.139 The victim ran away
from home in an attempt to contact the defendant but he was apprehended
by law enforcement officials and returned to his parents.140 Similarly,
Keelan and J.S. engaged in a sexual relationship over the course of a year

132. See id. at 1176 (charging the defendant with one count of coercion and
enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), interstate travel for the
purpose of engaging in sexual acts with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b),
one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2252(a)(4)(B), and one count of criminal forfeiture in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2253).
133. See id.
134. Compare id., with Keelan, 786 F.3d at 867.
135. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1176 (discussing that the defendant
also talked to the victim by phone).
136. See Keelan, 786 F.3d at 868 (explaining that Keelan slowly incorporated
sexual innuendos into their conversation to make J.S. more comfortable with sexual
activities).
137. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1176 (showing that the defendant
flew from Boston to Texas where he rented a car and drove the victim’s home in New
Mexico).
138. See Keelan, 786 F.3d at 869; see also Brief of Appellant at 16, United States v.
Keelan, 786 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-11878FF) (discussing evidence of
recorded telephone calls between J.S. and Keelan).
139. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1176.
140. See id. (stating that the victim flew from New Mexico to Massachusetts to go
to the defendant’s address but the defendant was not home).
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involving between thirty to sixty sexual encounters.141 In Johnson, after
encouragement from the defendant’s victim’s mother, the victim worked
together with the FBI to monitor conversations with the defendant and
eventually the FBI searched the Defendant’s residence.142 Likewise, J.S.’s
mother also convinced J.S. to cooperate with law enforcement officials.143
The defendant in United States v. Johnson disputed his $2,875.97
restitution order by arguing that the statutes regarding coercion and
enticement of minors and the transportation of a minor were not under the
MVRA and that the district court could not order restitution without
considering his ability to pay.144 Similarly, Keelan also disputed his
$104,886.05 restitution order from the district courts based on his crime’s
status as a crime of violence.145 The Tenth Circuit did not analyze whether
the transportation or the coercion and enticement of minors were crimes of
violence under the §16(b) definition because the defendant only contested
the restitution on the basis of his ability to pay.146 However, the court did
acknowledge that other circuits found the transportation of minors by its
nature a crime of violence, citing the analysis of other circuits regarding
other crimes involving minors.147 Specifically, United States v. Johnson
distinguished the analysis used in United States v. Butler and ruled that §
2423(b) is a crime to engage in sexual acts with specifically juvenile
victims and a crime of violence under § 16(b) because the crime itself has a
dangerous nature.148
141. See supra note 138, at 1 (stating that the encounters occurred in various
locations such as Keelan’s apartment, a motel, and a secluded island).
142. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1176-77 (explaining that FBI agents
found 238 floppy disks containing 13 images of children younger than sixteen
engaging in sexual conduct).
143. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at 10 (showing J.S. agreed to assist law
enforcement officers investigating Keelan by making recorded phone calls to Keelan
that were later turned into evidence).
144. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1178; see also 18 U.S.C. §
3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(i).
145. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 869-72 (arguing that Keelan should
not pay the restitution order because his convicted offense was not a violent offense
due to the absence of physical harm which was required by statute).
146. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1178-79 (showing that the defendant
failed to show his inability to pay the restitution order and the error in the order was not
“clear and obvious”).
147. See id. (citing United States v. Butler, 92 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1996)) (ruling
that transportation of a minor over state lines for sexual purposes is a crime).
148. Compare id., with United States v. Butler, 92 F.3d 960, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the crime of transporting a minor over state lines for the purpose of
prostitution or sexual activities was a crime of violence for sentencing and restitution
purposes).
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While the coercion and enticement of minors and the transportation of a
minor over state lines are two distinct crimes, both crimes involve the
sexual exploitation of a minor without criminalizing the actual sexual
encounter.149 The transportation of a minor Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)
criminalizes the transportation for the purposes of illicit sexual activity and
it does not require the actual sexual activity to occur.150 Other circuit
courts have found that the transportation with the intent to have sex with a
minor has a potential risk of physical harm for the minor.151 Separating the
statute from the facts of the case and applying the categorical approach, §
2423(b) is a crime with the potential for serious harm to its victims.152 The
crime of coercion and enticement of minors criminalizes the enticement
and coercion of a minor for prostitution or illicit sexual conduct.153 The
statute focuses on enticement and coercion of the defendant towards the
child where the defendant persuades the child to engage in sexual
activity.154 The main crime regards the actions defendants took to
manipulate or groom the child into becoming more comfortable with the
idea of participating in illicit sexual activities, but does not criminalize the
actual sexual activity with the child, similar to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).155
Therefore, the coercion and enticement actions required in § 2422(b)
should be regarded as equally harmful as the transportation actions required
in § 2423(b).156 Both statutes are subsets within group of statutes that
pertain to the child sexual exploitation, but do not focus on the specific act

149. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (criminalizing enticement and coercion of a minor for
prostitution or illicit sexual activity); accord 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (criminalizing
interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor).
150. See 18 U.S.C § 2423(b) (illustrating that within the statute the actual sexual
activity of sex with a minor is not an element but rather the statute criminalizes the
transportation with the intent to have sexual intercourse).
151. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1179 (citing United States v. Butler,
92 F.3d 960, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996)).
152. See id.
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (defining that the crime criminalizes the enticement
act and not the act of sex).
154. See id. (explaining that completion of a sexual act is not required for the crime
of coercion and enticement of a minor for prostitution or sexual activity).
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(B); United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865 (11th Cir.
2015) (No. 13-11878-FF) (explaining that Keelan enticed J.S. into participating in
sexual activities by emotionally manipulating J.S. and through sexual speech and
showing him pornographic videos); Brief of Appellee at 6, 8-9, 39-40.
156. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (criminalizing the coercion and enticement of a
minor for the purposes of sexual activity or prostitution), with 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)
(criminalizing interstate traveler using interstate commerce to participate in sexual
activities with a minor).
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of sexual activity.157 Sexual activity with a minor is inherently harmful
behavior, but it is not an element of either of these statutes.158 Both statutes
seek to criminalize behavior that occurs leading up to the event of sex with
a minor; the act of sex is not necessary for one’s actions to be considered
harmful.159 Thus, if the transportation of a minor was considered a crime
of violence for both sentencing and restitution purposes then the coercion
and enticement of minors should follow the same standard.160 There are
many discrepancies within the language of the definitions in 18 U.S.C. §
16(b), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 that can be
exploited to wrongfully contest a restitution order.161 However, case law
attempts to remedy the discrepancies by treating similar cases the same
way.162
The standard for a crime of violence should be uniform throughout all
types of crimes. The multiple definitions of a violent felony simply leave
too many loopholes in the law and ultimately allows defendants to have a
sentencing increase without having to pay the restitution associated with
the same crime.163 The Eleventh Circuit decided that Keelan had to pay the
restitution to J.S.’s parents; however, the standard for crimes of violence
for restitution does not have a history of being consistent.164 Restitution
orders are not necessarily parallel with the current sentencing guidelines,
which creates problems in the criminal justice system for defendants who
157. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), with 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)(demonstrating that
both statutes do not criminalize the act of intercourse but rather the conduct leading up
to the act).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b); see also United States v.
Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 870-71 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding attempted sexual abuse as a
violent when physical harm did not occur).
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
160. See generally United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1178 (citing United States
v. Butler, 92 F.3d 960, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996)) (determining that because § 2423(b) is a
crime of violence that it is likely that other similar crimes involving children should be
treated in a similar fashion).
161. Compare 18 U.S.C. 16(b) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); and U.S.S.G. §
4B1.32(a)(2) (demonstrating the similarities between the language used in all three
crime of violence definitions).
162. See generally United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1193 (11th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 899 (11th Cir. 1999) (defining the standard
in the Eleventh Circuit).
163. See generally United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d at 1193.
164. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2015) (showing that
Keelan was convicted by a jury after a three day trial and that Keelan was sentenced to
two concurrent prison terms of 200 months and a 25 year term of supervised release in
addition to the restitution order of 04,886.05 on August 7, 2013 for J.S.’s mental health
expenses).
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are unwilling to pay restitution to exploit.165 The percentage of victims that
actually receive restitution is very low and generally victim satisfaction
may not actually be provided through the MVRA.166
B. Forcing Victim’s to Prove They Suffered a “Crime of Violence” Makes
Receiving Restitution More Difficult and Contradicts the Purpose the
Legislation.
To gain restitution under the MVRA, the defendant must commit a crime
of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).167 Crimes of violence that
involve elements requiring physical force are considered enumerated
felonies, which are uncontested as being a crime of violence.168 However,
the defendant can always contest felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) by
challenging whether the felony involved a substantial risk that physical
force may be used against the person or property of another during the
commission of the offense.169 The district court decides who is considered
a victim in each case and the victim is the one who must assert their rights
to restitution.170 In Keelan’s case, the victim was under the age of eighteen,
and therefore, J.S.’s parents assumed his rights to receive the restitution
under the MVRA.171
The Eleventh Circuit has also ruled that other similar felonies involving
the sexual exploitation of children are also crimes of violence, such as
United States v. Rutherford, where for sentencing purposes in a case
regarding a defendant who had both drug trafficking and child exploitation

165. See generally Searcy, 418 F.3d at 1193.
166. See generally Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay: A critical Assessment of

the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1697-1699
(2009) (arguing that the amount of restitution ordered by the court is not correlated to
the amount of satisfaction received by victims because about 3.5 percent of restitution
orders are actually paid by the criminal offender).
167. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1) (explaining that the enumerated violent
felonies all involve a physical element of force).
168. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (requiring physical force as a necessary
element for a violent felony).
169. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (showing that other crimes which are not
enumerated felonies may still be considered a crime of violence if there is a potential
risk of harm as an alternative for crimes not mentioned in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)).
170. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(2) (allowing the parents to receive restitution
if the victim is under eighteen year old).
171. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 865 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that
J.S.’s parent wanted to receive restitution for $104,886.05 for the payment of J.S.’s
mental health expenses from the psychologist therapy sessions that J.S. is required to
attend as which arise from Keelan’s emotional manipulation of the victim).
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charges.172 The Eleventh Circuit decided that a court should only look to
the elements of the convicted offense and not the conduct underlying the
conviction when determining a crime of violence.173 The Eleventh Circuit
again used a categorical approach to prove a statute is a crime of violence
under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2 and further used this analysis to conclude that there
is no substantial difference between a decision that a statute is a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) and § 4B1.2.174 The Eleventh Circuit
interpreted this more broadly stating that the two crimes of violence
definitions are equivocal.175
While Keelan’s scenario is a case of first impression, there are other
cases which define the coercion and enticement as a crime of violence.176
In Searcy, the court ruled that the statute qualifies as a crime of violence
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 as a career offender.177 The defendant in Searcy
had two prior state charges—both were considered crimes of violence.178
The Searcy court determined this by comparing the federal coercion and
enticement statute to other similar statutes determined to be a crime of
violence from the Tenth and Sixth Circuit.179
The defendant argued that the essential elements of 18 U.S.C § 2422(b)
do not require any behavior that would, by its nature, pose a serious risk of
physical injury to another individual.180 The Eleventh Circuit used the
categorical to determine whether the coercion and enticement is a crime of

172. See United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling
that a Florida conviction for lewd assault of a minor was a crime of violence under
U.S.S.G. §4B1.2 showing the defendant as a career offender).
173. See id. (citing United States v. Lipsey, 40 F.3d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1994)).
174. See id. at 905 (citing United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242,
1243 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that both statutes defining a crime of violence are
somewhat different but if a statute is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) then
it should also be under § 4B1.2(a)(2)).
175. See id. (ruling that the definitions under § 4B1.2 and § 16(b) have the same
application).
176. See generally United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005).
177. See id. at 1195 (stating a defendant convicted under § 2422(b) was a career
offender under when he exchanged messages online with an undercover law
enforcement).
178. See id. at 1194 (citing that the defendant was previously convicted for sexual
activity with a child and lewd, lascivious or indecent assault upon a child in Florida).
179. See United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d at 1196-97 (using precedent from other
circuits as persuasive law to determine how the law should be interpreted in the Tenth
Circuit).
180. See id. at 1196 (arguing the underlying criminal conduct of § 2422(b) is
enticement, and not the sexual act therefore the statute does not pose a serious risk of
physical injury).
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violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.181 The first approach was determining
whether the use of attempted use of the coercion and enticement with the
federal statute has an element of physical force against another.182
However the analysis failed because the statute only pertains to the act of
persuasion, inducement, coercion or enticement, which does not involve
physical force under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1).183
The use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another
is also not included as elements in the statute.184 The second approach used
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2) to see if the Coercion
and Enticement Statute involves conduct that, by its nature, present a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another individual.185
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit cited cases from the Sixth Circuit which
applied a broad interpretation of the categorical approach to determine that
similar statutes relating to the sexual exploitation of a child are crimes of
violence.186 The Sixth Circuit broadly interpreted the coercion and
enticement of a minor as a crime of violence because “any felony involving
the sexual exploitation of a juvenile inherently poses a serious potential risk
of physical injury to the victim.”187
As a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the Government has
the burden to prove that the coercion and enticement of a minor is a crime
of violence for restitution purposes for J.S.’s parents to receive
compensation for his mental health expenses.188 While the district court
may issue restitution, the government will always have to prove that the

181. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 194 (2007).
182. See id.
183. See Unites States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding

that the underlying crime did not include an element of force).
184. See generally U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (showing that there is no requirement for
physical force to be used for a felony to be considered a crime of violence).
185. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining a crime of violence for sentencing
purposes as any conduct that by its nature presents a serious potential risk of injury to
another), with 18 U.S.C. §16(b) (requiring a serious potential risk of injury as an
element of a violent felony).
186. See United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1167-68 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Champion, 248 F.3d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 2001)) (determining that 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a), child pornography production is a violent felony); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a) (2015) (criminalizing any person who entices or coerces any minor to engage
in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating a depiction of a sexual act).
187. See id. at 1196 (citing United States v. Smith, 20 Fed. Appx. 412, 418 (6th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1070, 122 S. Ct. 1944, 152 L.Ed.2d 848 (2002)).
188. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining
that the magistrate judge entered a Report and Recommendation recommending Keelan
pay $104,886.05 pursuant to the MVRA in mental health expenses).
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committed crime is violent due to the discrepancies in definitions.189
Furthermore, the Government must also prove that the victim was directly
harmed by the defendant.190 If the Eleventh Circuit found that the coercion
and enticement of a minor was a crime of violence according to the
sentencing guidelines for a career offender, then the Eleventh Circuit would
have applied the same analysis to Keelan’s case.191 During the district
court trial, the court concluded that Keelan “groomed” J.S. and therefore
J.S. would more easily accept Keelan’s sexual advances.192 The magistrate
judge also excluded all costs before Keelan’s first sexual encounter with
J.S. because the previous psychological damages did not involve Keelan.193
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit found that Keelan did cause J.S.’s mental
health problems.194
Due to the recent decision in Johnson v. United States overruling James
v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the residual clause was
unconstitutionally vague for trying to extend the definition of a crime of
violence to include attempted crimes and felonies that did not have direct
use of physical force under the Armed Career Criminal Act.195 If the same
analysis for this act is applied to the MVRA, then it would make restitution
harder for victims to receive.196 The court in James relied heavily on the
ordinary case approach to show that a serious potential risk of injury would
create a crime of violence.197 Before the Johnson v. United States decision,

189. See id. at 865 (stating Keelan opposed the restitution because the state was not
a crime of violence, the victim did not suffer a bodily injury, the victim cannot recover
mental health treatment expenses for a physical injury, and the criminal offense did not
proximately cause the victim’s treatment expenses).
190. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
191. See Searcy, 418 F.3d at 1193.
192. See Keelan, 786 F.3d at 873 (stating J.S.’s psychologist, Dr. Patterson gave
expert testimony for the prosecution about Keelan’s child grooming process of J.S.).
193. See id. (finding that there was “no doubt” Keelan proximately caused J.S.’s
psychiatric problems after that date).
194. See id. (demonstrating testimony that J.S.’s prior mental health problems were
secondary to Keelan’s manipulation and abuse which further deteriorated when the
sexual exploitation started and J.S’s medical providers corroborated J.S.’s testimony).
195. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (arguing that
language in the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) was unconstitutional).
196. See generally id.
197. Compare James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 192 (2007) (showing that the
residual clause can extend a crime of violence to include offenses that do not have an
element of physical force as a crime of violence); with Johnson v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. at 2563 (ruling that the residual clause is too vague by allowing the definition of a
violent felony to extend so far that it includes felonies without an element of physical
force).
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the ordinary case approach would also reach the same conclusion, thereby
allowing J.S.’s family to receive restitution from Keelan under the
MVRA.198 However, if only the ordinary case approach was applied after
Johnson v. United States, then it is likely that J.S.’s parents would not
receive any restitution for the one count of attempted coercion and
enticement of a minor.199 Furthermore, J.S.’s parents may not receive
restitution at all because none of the elements of the Coercion and
Enticement Statute involve physical force, thus it may not be considered a
crime of violence.200
C. Restitution and Sentencing Increases Serve Different Purposes and
Should be Held to Different Standards.
Restitution serves a completely different purpose from general
sentencing and should not be held to the same standards. While restitution
is only one aspect of sentencing, the legislative history behind the MVRA
proves that Congress enacted the MVRA to deal with the rising costs
incurred as a result of violent crime-related injuries.201 The MVRA gives
district courts the discretion to order mandatory restitution paid to persons
who were harmed physically, emotionally, or financially by a criminal’s
unlawful conduct.202 Rather than merely addressing the rights of victims in
the criminal justice system, the MVRA expands the role of the justice
system to provide a means to make victims “whole”.203 Unlike the civil
court systems where the aggrieved parties receive damages as
compensation, the criminal justice system did not have a method to address
the issue of victim compensation.204 The MVRA requires full restitution
for the calculated harm caused by the defendant.205 This act makes it
possible for the defendant to be accountable for the harm suffered by his
198. See generally James v. United States, 550 U.S. at 192; see also Keelan, 786
F.3d at 871.
199. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2553.
200. See id. (demonstrating that the analysis shows that a crime needs a measurable
risk of harm or actual threat of harm to be considered a crime of violence).
201. See Victim Restitution Act of 1995, P.L. 104-132, § 735, 141 Stat. 4 (1995)
(explaining that the costs associated with crime include economic, physical and
emotional costs for victims and their families and that those costs remained
unaddressed).
202. See id. (showing the legislative intent behind the implementing of the MVRA).
203. See id. (addressing that the criminal justice system is flawed when addressing
the needs of victims who have suffered and amending the issue through the MVRA).
204. See id. (addressing the legislative intent behind the MVRA).
205. See id. (explaining that to receive mandatory restitution, a victim can only
receive damages for a harm suffered that can be calculated and converted into a
monetary amount, such as a medical bill for an injury incurred during an assault).
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victims and other individuals harmed by his criminal conduct.206
Therefore, restitution provides a means for a new beginning to victims who
have suffered personal and financial losses resulting from crime.207 The
legislators who enacted the MVRA stated that their goal was to “provide
the victim with some small sense of satisfaction that the system will
addresses their needs” and the MVRA has acted out this purpose in its
application.208 Even if the restitution ordered was nominal, the restitution
would represent personal accountability from the offender no matter how
small the payment, leaving the victim satisfaction with the criminal justice
system.209
However, by expanding the definition of a violent felony of 18 U.S.C. §
16(b) to be the equivalent of the definition in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4B1.2 does have consequences for other sentencing purposes.
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the amount of violent felonies
received has an impact on one’s overall prison term if the defendant is a
career offender.210 If a defendant has three or more convictions, including
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for unlawful use of a firearm, then
his sentence would increase to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years.211
Applying the crime of violence standard this way to the crime of coercion
and enticement of a minor would directly conflict with the recent Supreme
Court ruling in Johnson v. United States for sentencing purposes.212
However, by considering the intent of the MVRA legislation, separating
the standards for crimes of violence between the standard for restitution
and the standard for regular sentencing would continue to enforce the
original intention of the MVRA.213 Congress repeatedly emphasized that
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. 141 CONG. REC. H1302, H1303 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (quoting a statement

of Rep. Pryce).
209. See generally A Bill to Provide for Restitution of Victims of Crimes, and for
Other Purposes: Hearing in S. 173 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
1 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 141 CONG. REC. H1302, H1306 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Foley) (“For far too long we have forgotten the
innocent victims of crime.”).
210. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2015) (stating that under the ACCA, if a
defendant has three or more violent felonies and has also violated 18 U.S.C. §922(g),
he will have his prison sentence increased to a minimum of fifteen years in prison); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2)(g) (explaining the statute for an unlawful use of a firearm).
211. See id. (explaining that a felon with three or more convictions for drug
trafficking crimes or crimes of violence are required to serve more time in jail because
the defendant is a repeat offender).
212. See generally Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2551 (2015).
213. See Victim Restitution Act of 1995, P.L. 104-132, § 735, 141 Stat. 4 (1995)
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the MVRA was created for the purpose of compensating victims and not
for furthering punishment.214
The main opposition for the MVRA are people who find it unfair for
defendants to pay restitution to a victim if the defendant cannot afford to
pay the restitution.215 Opponents of the MVRA argue that the MVRA is
unconstitutional for not considering the defendant’s ability to pay, therefore
further punishing a defendant who will never be able to pay.216 In the
Tenth Circuit decision United States v. Johnson, the defendant was
required to pay the district court’s restitution order despite being
unemployed and the court argued that his current unemployment status was
not enough evidence to prove that he could not pay the restitution order.217
Within the Victims Restitution Act of 1995, the MVRA complies with the
court-prescribed restitution payments and the courts allow both the victim
and the offender to petition the courts to modify the restitution order at any
time.218 Unlike normal federal sentences where there is no prospect of
parole and the defendant must serve an entire sentence, the mandatory
restitution may be contested and modified during the process of
payment.219 The MVRA follows the court-prescribed schedule and may act
as a condition for probation or supervised release.220 Although restitution
is only one aspect of general sentencing issues, it should not be treated the
same way as a normal prison sentence; therefore, restitution should not be
taken into consideration with the same analysis as a regular law that defines
sentencing.221
(demonstrating Congress’ legislative intent behind creating the MVRA and the desire
to compensate victims who have suffered from violent crime).
214. See id.
215. See generally United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999)
(arguing that the MVRA is unconstitutional for not considering the defendant’s ability
to pay restitution, however the argument is never analyzed because the defendant failed
to provide a factual claim in his appeal).
216. See generally id.
217. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that the defendant
was still required to pay restitution for several counts of child exploitation although he
claims that he did not have the ability to pay because he was unemployed).
218. See Victim Restitution Act of 1995, P.L. 104-132, § 735, 141 Stat. 4 (1995)
(showing that the MVRA allows the victim or offender to petition the court to modify a
restitution order at any time and that there is a court-prescribed schedule of restitution
payments as a condition for probation or supervised release).
219. See generally id.
220. See id.
221. See id.; see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015)
(ruling that the definition of a crime of violence for sentencing purposes under the
Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague).
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
While there are many positive aspects about the MVRA, there are also
many discrepancies with determining what crimes are considered violent
and non-violent for restitution purposes.222 One way to eliminate this
problem in the MVRA is to expand the list of specific enumerated felonies
by explicitly stating that only felonies that involve physical force and
eliminating the condition of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).223 However, this approach
may exclude more ambiguous crimes that do not have a clear requirement
of physical harm; specifically child exploitation crimes which may have
been either consensual due to “child grooming” or were abruptly stopped
before a physical assault could occur.224 At Keelan’s trial, an expert
witness testified about the six phase “grooming process” which persuaded
J.S. into sexual activity with Keelan.225 Crimes such as trafficking of a
minor or coercion and enticement of a minor may not be included in that
category because the physical harm is not an explicit element of those
crimes. However, case law has determined that crimes against children,
specifically child exploitation crimes, taken at face value are violent
because a child is always at a risk of physical harm for not complying with
the offender.226 Furthermore, child victims should be held to a different
standard than other victims because children, especially victims of “child
grooming,” may comply with an adult’s demands simply because the adult
is a figure of authority.227 Restitution under the current standard, using the
222. See generally Beth Bates Holliday, Annotation, Who is a “Victim” Entitled to
Restitution Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.A. §
3663A), 26 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 283 (2008); see also Kimberly J. Winbush, Article, Persons
or Entities Entitled to Restitution as “Victim” Under State Criminal Restitution Statute,
92 A.L.R. 5th 35.
223. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (showing that an element of force is required for a
crime of violence for restitution purposes); with 18 U.S.C § 16(b) (demonstrating a
crime of violence for restitution purposes has is a potential risk of physical harm within
the crime itself).
224. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (criminalizing the coercion and enticement
of a minor); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (criminalizing the transportation of a minor
over state lines for sex); see also United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 868 (11th Cir.
2015).
225. See id. (demonstrating the six steps of child grooming: “identification,
connection, information gathering, need fulfillment, sexual inhibition reduction, and
preservation”).
226. See generally United States v. Munro. 394 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2005).
227. See id. (finding that any crime against a child involves an element of force
because the offender uses their status as an adult to claim authority and power over the
child); see also Bridget M. Boggess, Note, Attempted Enticement of a Minor: No Place
for Pedophiles to Hide Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), 72 Mo. L. Rev. 909 (2007) (noting
that children are vulnerable to the advances and abuse from an adult due to the
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categorical approach, creates the best result for fairness for the defendant
and justice for the victim.228 Unless Congress is willing to review all
statutes and define whether there should be mandatory restitution for those
crimes, the categorical analysis is the preferred method because it keeps
sentencing and restitution within the powers of the judiciary branch and not
the legislative branch.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the MVRA to provide a means of monetary
compensation to make a victim of a crime of violence “whole.”229
However, the statute itself has many problems in practically providing
restitution to the victims who are entitled to the restitution.230 One of the
many problems of the act is trying to classify the charged crime as a crime
of violence under the MVRA to receive restitution such as Keelan’s
scenario.231 While the MVRA allows some kind of restitution for victims,
there are still many problems because the victims’ power is limited by the
presiding judge, who ultimately determines the restitution order and the
actual restitution the defendant pays.232 Furthermore, the MVRA itself does
not take into account the ability of the defendant to actually pay the
restitution.233 Thus, it is difficult for victims to really know if they are
being compensated and “made whole” by the MVRA.234

influence and power an adult has over a child).
228. See Keelan, 786 F.3d at 870-71 (noting several cases where courts applied the
categorical approach in the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a crime was a crime
of violence under the MVRA).
229. See generally A Bill to Provide for Restitution of Victims of Crimes, and for
Other Purposes: Hearing in S. 173 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
1 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that the purpose of the MVRA is to
compensate the victims of violent crime through monetary damages).
230. See Dickman, supra note 166, at 1695 (citing R. Barry Ruback, The Imposition
of Economic Sanctions in Philadelphia: Costs, Fines, and Restitution, FED. PROBATION,
June 2004, at 21, 25) (stating that the MVRA’s restitution framework exponentially
increases the low levels of criminal debt collection).
231. See generally Keelan, 786 F.3d at 868.
232. See generally Victim Restitution Act of 1995, P.L. 104-132, § 735, 141 Stat. 4
(1995) (showing that the offender and victim may petition the court to amend the
restitution order but only the judge decides if there will be an order).
233. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (stating that the ability to actually pay the
restitution is not an element of the MVRA and that the courts would schedule smaller
payment increments).
234. See Dickman, supra note 166, at 1695 (arguing that victims are not actually
compensated through the MVRA because the percentage of victims who actually
receive compensation is low).
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Alternative government programs to the MVRA exist such as the VOM
program which allows the victim and the offender to regularly meeting in
supervised counseling sessions.235 This program not only forces the
offender to take responsibility for the harm they have caused, but it also
gives the victim peace of mind.236 However, for sex crimes, especially
child exploitation crimes, this method of trying to make the victim “whole”
may be detrimental to the victim. Specifically, children who are victims of
the child grooming process would not benefit from these supervised
sessions because the victim’s trauma resulted from the contact with a
predator similar to Keelan.237
Furthermore, the victim bears the
responsibility of initiating this type resolution.238 There is no other
program that provides resolution for a victim of a sex crime which does not
involve actively meeting with the victim.239 Currently, the restitution
ordered by the courts is the best and only type of court-ordered act that can
possibly come close to compensating for the psychological harm that J.S.
suffered.240 While J.S. actually receiving restitution is a completely
separate matter, the idea that the criminal justice system is moving towards
a more victim-focused approach shows progression in policy and
application.

235. See Dickman, supra note 166, at 1715 (suggesting that an alternative to the
MVRA is a court ordered counseling program between offenders and victims).
236. See Dickman, supra note 166, at 1715 (arguing that the VOM is a superior
alternative to the MVRA because it provides better victim satisfaction).
237. See United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2015) (showing that
J.S.’s mental health expenses directly resulted from the psychological mistreatment
from Keelan’s child grooming techniques which were used to entice J.S.).
238. See Dickman, supra note 166, at 1716.
239. See id. at 1688 (showing that the MVRA is one of the first attempts of the
criminal justice system to try to compensate victims of crime through monetary
means).
240. See generally Keelan, 786 F.3d at 865-66; see also generally Victim
Restitution Act of 1995, P.L. 104-132, § 735, 141 Stat. 4 (1995).
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